Wittgenstein and the Will

I think Wittgenstein makes an important point in emphasizing the fact that willing is not a separate action that itself must be willed. He says: "I can't will willing; that is, it makes no sense to speak of willing willing. 'Willing' is not the name of an action; and so not the name of any voluntary action either" (137). He continues: "When I raise my arm 'voluntarily( I do not use any instrument to bring the movement about. My wish is not such an instrument either" (137).

It seems that Wittgenstein breaks down the problem of will into a question of voluntary vs. involuntary actions--those actions that are voluntary are willed, those that are involuntary aren't willed. The will, then, isn't some sort of other mental process that precedes an action such as raising one's arm. The will, or willing, is merely doing something voluntarily. And for Wittgenstein the normal things we do are voluntary and thus willed. It's when they aren't voluntary, when we do them without our knowledge, that they aren't voluntary and willed, such as sleep walking. Wittgenstein says:

Involuntary walking, going for a walk, eating, speaking, singing, would be walking, eating, speaking etc. in an abnormal surrounding. E.g. when one is unconscious...(143).

I wonder, though, about instances where it seems one can't clearly define whether one wills something or not, whether one does something completely voluntarily or if part if done involuntarily. It seems that a lot of our actions are only partially willed, done voluntarily only in part, even if it may seem we do them voluntarily. But maybe this is what Wittgenstein's getting at--that will as a force doesn't exist, that maybe we can't control our actions in that sense but that we can be conscious of them (and then are what he calls voluntary). I' m still having problems with the voluntary/involuntary issue, since it seems they often overlap in real life. Maybe it's wrong to classify things as stricly voluntary or involuntary and strictly willed or unwilled; it's perhaps the case that they always overlap to some degree.